

CIVIL SOCIETY OPTIONS PAPER ON THE IGAD HIGH-LEVEL REVITALIZATION FORUM



INTERNATIONAL YOUTH FOR
AFRICA (IYA)

"Empowering the youth
for sustainable Development"



Together we make the difference

Organization for Women Development



South Sudan Action Network
on Small Arms



Human Rights Development
Organisation - South Sudan
Promoting human rights in South Sudan



SSHURSA




"Your Rights, Your Dignity"



"Human Beings are Born
with Equal Dignity"

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
WORKING GROUP
SOUTH SUDAN



Contents

Summary	2
Introduction	4
Conditions for HLRF Success	4
Framework for Civic Participation	5
Framework for Participation of Political and Military Actors	6
Design of the Mediation	8
Transitional Governance Arrangements.....	8
Security Arrangements	9
Reform Agenda	10
Timeframe for the Transition	10
Economic Recovery	11
What happens if the HLRF fails?	11
Annex – Signatories	12

Summary

- This paper provides a series of options for the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) to consider in its efforts to revitalize the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). The paper draws from numerous meetings that South Sudanese civil society actors have held on the peace process since the outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016 and the subsequent spread of the conflict.
- **The High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) must meet three conditions if it is to stand a chance of success:** (1) it must be inclusive, meaning that it must involve the signatories to the ARCSS, the various factions of those groups, and additional armed groups that have emerged since the agreement was signed, as well as civic actors, including faith leaders, civil society, women, youth, academics, displaced persons and traditional authorities, (2) the agenda for the talks should focus on governance and security arrangements as these are the most politically contentious issues, and (3) the process should not be allowed to continue indefinitely and IGAD should stipulate a specific date at which it will hand responsibility for mediating the crisis to another institution.
- **The HLRF should use a two-track process in which political and military actors negotiate directly in track I and civic voices are given a formal consultative role in track II.** IGAD should make provision for civic actors to participate as observers in the track I process and any civic actor that is interested to contribute their ideas on the way forward for South Sudan should be allowed to do so through the track II process. Special provision should be made for women's participation, both as members of the various political, military and civic groups involved, as well as an independent constituency of their own. IGAD should aim for a minimum of 30 percent women's participation across stakeholder groups and in the mediation itself.
- **IGAD should adopt a tiered approach to the discussions among political and military actors in which participation in discussions around the different agenda items are determined through the application of an agreed upon criteria.** One major line of distinction will lie between those groups that exist primarily as community defense forces and those that have more of a national political agenda. The former category of armed actors may have less of a role to play in discussions about transitional governance arrangements at the national level and could be engaged directly at the local level in South Sudan. Civil society actors can assist mediators in mapping these armed groups and identifying their political positions.
- The mediation should not repeat the mistake of the previous IGAD process by focusing exclusively on power sharing among the various armed groups as the only solution to the conflict. Instead, **mediators should explore governance arrangements in which the existing leadership cedes power to a less politicized and more technocratic leadership.** Such a political transition could be approached in any number of ways. For example, the existing leadership could agree to not serve in the transitional government, they could serve the transitional government and agree not to contest in the elections, or they could establish a joint presidency for the existing leaders in which most decision-making authority is delegated to a less politicized prime minister position.
- **The negotiating parties will need to establish a new timeframe for elections as the security and humanitarian context does not allow for elections to be conducted in August 2018 as provided for in the ARCSS.** We recommend a new transition of no less than three to five years to allow sufficient time for the country to stabilize before conducting elections.
- **The reform agenda as provided for in the ARCSS** – including commitments with respect to longer term economic reforms; transitional justice, reconciliation and healing; and

constitutional development – should remain binding on any transitional government to emerge from the HLRF process. However, the HLRF may need to discuss immediate economic reforms that can maximize the benefits of the remaining oil revenue and create confidence among international donors to provide the transitional government with funds to implement the agreement.

- IGAD should set a specific end date for the HLRF process. **If the HLRF fails to secure a political settlement by that date, IGAD should hand the peace process over to the African Union (AU) and call for the imposition of punitive measures.**

Introduction

Since the outbreak of violence in Juba in July 2016 and the spread of the conflict to previously stable parts of South Sudan, civil society actors have been meeting to discuss what can be done to salvage the peace agreement. A clear consensus emerged that if the peace agreement is not dead, then it is severely wounded and courageous leadership by leaders on all sides of the political divide is needed to restore stability. This options paper summarizes the main conclusions and recommendations that have emerged from these meetings. The purpose is to inform IGAD's efforts to revitalize the August 2015 peace agreement. We hope that this submission opens the door to additional more concrete forms of collaboration between civic actors and IGAD.

Conditions for HLRF Success

Three conditions are indispensable to the success of the HLRF or any other effort to resolve the conflict in South Sudan:

1. Maximum inclusivity – Since IGAD first announced its intention to revisit the ARCSS, we as South Sudanese civil society have maintained that the process must be inclusive if it is to succeed. On the military and political level, this requires the participation of signatories to the agreement, whether currently 'estranged' or not, as well as groups that came into existence after the agreement was signed. Mediators must also create space for civic voices to participate, such as faith leaders, civil society, women, youth, academics, displaced persons and traditional authorities. These civic groups can help to:
 - Provide technical input and generate ideas for both mediators and negotiating parties.
 - Serve as a bridge between the mediation and populations on the ground in South Sudan. Civic groups can consolidate citizen viewpoints and channel them towards the HLRF while also providing their constituencies with updates on the HLRF process.
 - Build trust among the negotiating parties by engaging them in a constructive manner and encouraging them to engage with the HLRF process.
 - Ensure the credibility of the HLRF process and a sense of ownership over the outcome among populations in South Sudan.

In the subsections below, we provide additional information on how political and military groups and civic actors might be engaged in the HLRF process, taking into consideration the challenges that the previous IGAD mediation effort encountered in trying to engage some of these actors.

In approaching the issue of inclusivity, special consideration should be given to the participation of experienced female leaders. Studies show that strong women's participation can help to improve the outcomes and sustainability of peace processes. To ensure gender inclusion in this regard, we recommend that the mediation aim for a minimum of 30 percent women's representation across the board. This would apply equally to South Sudanese participants as well as mediators and their staffs. Women representatives across the various stakeholder groups should also be given a separate space to talk. Such discussions can help to empower women and amplify their voice throughout the process.

2. Focused agenda – IGAD’s decision to convene the HLRF was a recognition that circumstances in South Sudan have changed dramatically in the two years since the ARCSS was signed. Not only has the humanitarian and security context deteriorated dramatically, but parties that signed the peace agreement have fractured, new actors have emerged and administrative changes have complicated certain aspects of the agreement. For example, the new 32 state administrative arrangement calls into question numerous provisions in the ARCSS, including those pertaining to transitional governance structures, power sharing, wealth sharing and elections. The HLRF must therefore walk a delicate line in providing space to discuss those aspects of the peace agreement that require amendment without opening the entire agreement to renegotiation.

The HLRF agenda should therefore focus on governance and security as the immediate priorities. A political settlement on these issues could help to create an environment that is conducive to the implementation of the ARCSS and broader national dialogue. In practice, this will require IGAD to adjust or amend certain ARCSS provisions, particularly in Chapters I and II of the agreement. The reform agenda as outlined in the remainder of the agreement provides a framework for the transitional government to deliver on its mandate and should remain a binding commitment.

3. Timebound deliberations – While mediators must be careful to avoid artificial deadlines, so too should they take care to ensure that intransigent parties are not permitted to drag the HLRF process on indefinitely. IGAD has proposed a very ambitious timeframe in which the HLRF process would be concluded in September 2017 and the outcome implemented in October 2017. With just one year remaining until the end of transitional period, the warring parties must reach an agreement on the way forward as soon as possible. By mid-September, however, IGAD had made very little progress and was already considering changes to the timeframe. IGAD could help to ensure timely deliberations if mediators stipulate a specific date by which IGAD will cede responsibility for mediating the crisis to another institution. For example, the IGAD Special Envoy could say that if the HLRF fails to reach a settlement by the end of 2017, it will hand the mediation process over to the African Union (AU) and impose punitive measures on the warring parties.

Framework for Civic Participation

The framework that the mediation adopts for the inclusion of civic voices should take into consideration challenges that the previous IGAD mediation encountered in engaging with these actors as well as the limited timeframe of the HLRF process. We recommend that the mediation adopt a two-track approach in which the political and military actors would negotiate directly in track I and civic voices (including faith leaders, civil society representatives, women leaders, youth leaders and academics) would play a formal consultative role in a parallel track II process. The role of the track II process would be to provide analysis and ideas to both mediators and the negotiating parties in track I, to channel their views and aspirations into the HLRF process, and to provide updates to people in South Sudan and the diaspora on the progress of the talks.

We also recommend that the mediation adopt an informal approach to track II that does not seek to privilege any particular groups or individuals, but instead invites engagement from any civic actor that

wishes to share its views on the resolution of the conflict. Such an approach would reduce the internal pressure on civic groups to select representatives, while also reducing incentives for political and military actors to coopt the civic space, as happened in the last round of IGAD talks. Under such an approach, civic groups could have representatives participate in the track I process as observers, to ensure that they are well-informed about the progress of the talks and confirm that the views of their constituencies have been duly considered by the negotiating parties. To safeguard the integrity of the process, the individuals selected to be observers must be endorsed by both civic groups and mediators and a formalized procedure for making submissions should be established. IGAD should also provide support to civic groups (e.g. facilitation of visa applications) to enable them to travel to the venue of the mediation and consult with the mediators and negotiating parties.

As important as participation in the mediation is for civic actors, the freedom to discuss the HLRF process in Juba and other parts of South Sudan is even more important. We have already seen worrying signs that the security services are preventing civil society organizations from meeting to deliberate on the HLRF process. This restriction of our right to deliberate on matters of public interest greatly undermines our ability to effectively contribute to the HLRF process. We therefore ask that IGAD and the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) raise this issue in its discussions with the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGONU) and press for guarantees that civic groups will be granted permission to hold meetings to discuss the HLRF in South Sudan, that those meetings will not be interfered with, and that they will not face travel restrictions when leaving or entering the country. If IGAD and JMEC representatives co-host these deliberations with civic groups, it could provide an additional layer of protection for civic groups that want to participate in the HLRF.

Lastly, IGAD should consider the important role that the media plays in communicating developments concerning the HLRF to populations in South Sudan. While some aspects of the talks may be sensitive and media exposure could be counterproductive to securing concessions from the negotiating parties, such censure of information should only be made only in exceptional circumstances and the default for the mediation should be to make as much information publicly available as possible to ensure that South Sudanese are aware of what is happening and have a stake in the outcome. Mediators should establish formal contact with news agencies (print, online, television and radio) that have audiences in South Sudan and invite them to cover the talks, particularly key moments that are likely to attract public attention. IGAD and JMEC should also secure assurances from the TGONU that the media will be allowed to cover the talks without censure from the government.

Framework for Participation of Political and Military Actors

Leaving aside the political challenge of convincing armed groups to participate in the HLRF, perhaps the most difficult technical challenge that the HLRF will confront concerns modalities for engaging the numerous political and military actors that are currently active in South Sudan. Since the resurgence of violence in Juba in July 2016, the armed opposition has fractured into several factions, the theater of war has expanded to include previously stable parts of the country, particularly in Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal regions, and new armed opposition groups have emerged with different political and military objectives. Government forces too have faced internal pressures and defections that threaten the tenuous alliances between government troops and government-allied militia. It is becoming increasingly difficult to determine who represents whose interests, with divergences apparent among the various factions on all sides of the political divide, as well as between the political leadership and the people they purport to represent.

To best engage the multiplicity of political and military groups, IGAD should adopt a tiered approach in which participation in discussions around the different agenda items are determined through the application of an agreed upon criteria. With estimates of anywhere from 20 or so to many dozens of distinct armed groups active in South Sudan today, it is not feasible or desirable to include them all in the discussions about the national-level political settlement. One option could be to adopt a more local level of engagement for community defense groups, focusing on their specific grievances and the appropriate responses in terms of political concessions and security arrangements. In addition, political groups that do not have alliances with armed groups may not need to participate as fully in certain discussions around security arrangements and cessation of hostilities.

Before and during the main HLRF discussions, IGAD should encourage the various parties that are to participate in the process to convene their members so that they can develop platforms to guide their engagement. To the extent opposition groups are willing to form alliances to negotiate from a common position in the HLRF, they should be encouraged to do so as this will make the process more manageable. However, parties should not be forced to negotiate as a block if they deem such alliances not to be in their interest or in the interest of the constituencies they represent. To determine the political loyalties of armed groups at the community level, IGAD should engage them directly to determine the extent to which military or political actors involved in the track I process can credibly represent their interests.

The region should also avoid parallel initiatives that can give rise to opportunities for forum-shopping and undermine the ability of HLRF mediators to deliver on their mandate. Efforts to reunify the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), for example, should be discouraged as they would likely serve to complicate the stakeholder engagement with the HLRF.

To help guide mediators' decisions about which political and military actors to involve in which aspects of the HLRF process, we offer the following criteria.

1. Political platform – The HLRF should distinguish between those groups that have a national political agenda and those that exist to defend the interests of particular communities. Groups that lack a national political platform may not need to participate as fully in discussions about transitional arrangements at the national level, though provision should be made to discuss their local grievances and ensure that resolutions to those issues are reflected in any political settlement that emerges from the HLRF process. To better ascertain the interests and priorities of the various groups and determine how they should participate, mediators should engage with as many of them as possible before the track I process starts.
2. Military capacity – The HLRF should distinguish between those political and military actors with armed wings and those that exist as political formations only. The latter category of actors would have much to contribute to discussions about governance arrangements, but may not be as central to certain discussions about security arrangements, such as those relating to the declaration or redeployment of forces. Other discussions, such as those relating to security sector reforms, should be open to broader participation.
3. Constituency – Political and military actors participating in the HLRF process should be able to demonstrate that they have constituencies in South Sudan. The process should not seek to engage specific personalities based on their reputation alone, but because they are representing the interests of a clearly defined constituency. By consulting civic actors and engaging armed groups on the ground in South Sudan, IGAD can better assess the degree to

which the parties to the HLRF can defend the interests of the constituencies they claim to represent.

4. Date of establishment – The initiation of the HLRF process could potentially spur the creation of new armed groups to access what they see as the possibility for reward through the HLRF process. To avoid this, the HLRF could consider providing a privileged position to groups that were established before some predetermined date.

The above criteria are by no means exhaustive and they are offered here as a reference for mediators as they design the HLRF process and should be tested and adapted as the situation demands.

Design of the Mediation

To succeed where past mediation efforts have failed, IGAD must critically examine its own approach to mediation to ensure it has the capacity to deliver on what is bound to be a very complicated endeavor. If the HLRF is going to engage with armed groups in South Sudan itself, the mediation will need the human resources to do so effectively. As the IGAD Special Envoy on South Sudan will not be able to conduct meetings in rural areas of South Sudan alongside his other responsibilities, he will need senior advisers with the time and capacity to hold these discussions with local armed groups. IGAD should also appoint a focal person whose role is to engage with civic actors and maintain an open line of communication with mediators.

Transitional Governance Arrangements

Perhaps the most useful starting point for assessing potential outcomes in terms of governance arrangements is to identify the least attractive arrangements and to work backwards to determine the ones that are most conducive to longer term peace and stability. First, we must acknowledge that the TGONU in its current form has not resolved the political disagreements that led to the violence in the first place and that an alternative political arrangement is necessary to convince the armed opposition groups to put down their guns. We trust that IGAD and their supporters in the international community have also come to this realization, hence the interest in a revitalized peace process.

Once we have accepted that a new political arrangement is necessary, the next question is to what extent political accommodation in the form of power sharing can create conditions conducive to longer term peace. While some form of accommodation may be necessary to provide armed opposition groups with an incentive to resolve their grievances through peaceful means, we caution against an overreliance on power sharing formulas as a panacea for the conflict. Successive peace processes in South Sudan have focused almost exclusively on rewarding the political and military leaders responsible for the conflict, giving rise to a system in which violence viewed as a legitimate tool of political negotiation. While this approach may have had some short-term success in the past, it is now facing diminishing returns as politics becomes more and more militarized and little room is left for peaceful political participation.

If power sharing is not a desirable outcome, that leaves us to consider governance arrangements in which the political and military leadership that is directing this war takes a step back and allows for a less politicized leadership to assume control over the transition. Such a transitional arrangement would give space for the people of South Sudan to recover from the years of hardship to which they have been subjected and could generate greater political will to enable humanitarian assistance, the

return and resettlement of displaced populations and the implementation of the reform agenda outlined in the ARCSS, including national elections, the constitutional development process, transitional justice, healing and reconciliation. To limit incentives for the transitional leadership to entrench itself at the expense of credible elections at the end of the transitional period, those serving in the transitional government above a predetermined position and rank should be barred from contesting in the elections.

Of course, the challenge that mediators would face in securing such an arrangement would be convincing the existing leadership to cede power to a less political and more technocratic government. To succeed in such an effort, the mediation would need the full backing of the region and a clear political strategy for how to assure leaders on all sides of the political divide that their interests would be protected during the transitional period. As this topic relates to this design phase of the HLRF, our main recommendation is that the agenda for the talks be crafted in such a way that space is provided to discuss governance arrangements such as these and that conversations do not focus exclusively on power sharing. Mediators could also consider tabling a proposal for a technocratic government on behalf of the IGAD region.

Security Arrangements

The failure of the ARCSS security arrangements was a proximate cause of the violence that erupted in Juba in July 2016 and is partially to blame for the spread of the conflict since then. In addition, the fracturing of armed groups and the emergence of new groups has rendered many of ARCSS's provisions on permanent ceasefire and security arrangements obsolete. In approaching the discussions of security arrangements, mediators should be guided by several considerations:

- The conflict in South Sudan is an amalgamation of many conflicts and mediators must sometimes approach these conflicts on their own terms and develop security arrangements that are tailored to the local context. An appropriately sequenced, theater-by-theater approach to the various conflicts in South Sudan could help to structure these discussions.
- As noted above, mediators should distinguish between armed groups that exist primarily as community defense forces and those that have more of a political platform. Ceasefires for the former category of actors may be best negotiated on the ground in South Sudan whereas talks involving the groups with more of a national agenda could be held outside of South Sudan.
- Experience with the ARCSS has shown that cantonment sites can be used by the warring parties to recruit additional forces under the guise of redeployment of forces. To limit the potential for warring parties to abuse the process in this manner, community defense forces and other militia should be reintegrated into their communities whenever possible and cantonment should be reserved for organized forces that cannot be readily reintegrated into their home communities. The reintegration process provides an opportunity to reform, modernize and streamline the military and should not be used to fund its expansion.
- The TGONU and other military and political groups invited to participate in the HLRF should approach the talks without preconditions. Donors too should avoid conditions that require armed groups to renounce violence before they will fund the HLRF process. The conflict in South Sudan has degenerated to a point where the warring parties can no longer trust one another's commitments to cease hostilities and the only way to rebuild this trust is through dialogue. Once the parties have committed to engaging one another in the context of the

HLRF, mediators can try to get specific concessions as confidence-building measures, such as a declaration of the number of troops or agreement on buffer zones in front line areas.

- Provision should be made for regional or international forces, such as the Regional Protection Force (RPF) and UN peacekeepers, to help establish security while the national army reconstitutes and reforms itself.

The above considerations are but a few ideas to inform IGAD's thinking about the discussions around security arrangements. A more substantive discussion would benefit from additional detail on the specific circumstances at play, including the location, size and disposition of forces and the negotiating priorities of the various armed groups.

Reform Agenda

The mandate for any transitional government that emerges from the HLRF process should focus first and foremost on establishing security, returning and resettling displaced populations and ensuring humanitarian assistance to populations in need. The government must also initiate reforms to help spur the state and nation-building process and help prevent the recurrence of conflict. The ARCISS provides an extensive framework for these reforms and the commitments that were made in the agreement should remain binding on the transitional government. Where third parties have obligations in the implementation of certain provisions, such as the AU's obligation to establish a hybrid court to hold accountable individuals responsible for international crimes, they should proceed accordingly.

Timeframe for the Transition

With respect to the timeframe for the transition, the looming deadline of the end of the ARCSS in October 2018 and the requirement that elections be conducted by August 2018 presents an implacable barrier. As numerous civil society organizations, outside observers, and more recently, United Nations officials, have observed, the current political and security context does not allow for elections and if the TGONU were to strictly adhere to the timeframe in ARCSS it would almost certainly provoke additional violence. Therefore, the political transition must necessarily be extended beyond that provided for in the ARCSS. There are two options, in this respect: either the ARCSS itself may be extended in conjunction with whatever amendments are necessary to put in place governance and security arrangements that are acceptable to the warring parties, or the ARCSS could be allowed to end in accordance with the existing timeframe and the HLRF could establish a new transitional arrangement to govern South Sudan thereafter.

In either event, elections must be postponed until they can be done safely and fairly. Given the damage that the conflict has done to the social fabric in South Sudan and the heavily militarized nature of our society, we do not advise a rush to elections merely for the semblance of legitimacy that it can confer on the new political dispensation. Rather, we recommend a lengthy transition of three to five years, which would allow sufficient time for the political, economic and social context to stabilize and for people to return to their homes and reestablish their lives before embarking on the electoral process. During this time, the transitional government can engage its citizens in national dialogue about the underlying causes of violence in South Sudan, develop a permanent constitution, proceed with its plans for transitional justice, reconciliation and healing, and initiate the reform process as outlined in the ARCSS.

Economic Recovery

Even if the HLRF process were to secure an agreement on the political and security arrangements, South Sudan would not be able to emerge from this crisis without a clear plan for economic recovery. More responsible use of oil revenue would be a first step. However, given the current state of oil production, the extent to which the government has leveraged future oil production to finance the war effort, and the fees that Sudan charges for the use of its pipeline to the Red Sea, the government will not be able to finance a transitional arrangement on its own and will require considerable financial support from the donor community.

The HLRF should therefore discuss immediate economic reforms that can serve to both maximize the use of the remaining oil revenue and create confidence among donors that any injection of funds will not be lost through corruption or channeled to finance additional conflict. Among the economic reforms that could be considered are the placement of oil revenue in an internationally monitored escrow account, restrictions on military spending, restrictions on new contracts in the oil sector, and various sorts of international oversight or joint decision-making in the finance sector, such as appointing a non-South Sudanese national to head the Bank of South Sudan (BoSS).

What happens if the HLRF fails?

IGAD faces a daunting task in securing a political settlement through the HLRF process. Not only must it contend with the fracturing of armed groups and the proliferation of new political formations, but divisions among IGAD member states themselves undermine the diplomatic leverage that mediators have at their disposal. From the very start of the conflict, it has been clear that the four frontline states of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda are essential to the solution of the conflict in South Sudan. Only they can offer the incentives and disincentives that are needed to bring the various factions together behind the terms of a political settlement. To date, the vested interests of some political elites in the region have prevented IGAD from mounting a united response. The next few months will show whether the situation in South Sudan has reached a point at which it poses such a serious threat to regional peace and stability that the region is forced to respond accordingly, or whether IGAD's ability to respond will once again be undermined by narrowly defined state or personal interests.

If the HLRF process fails, the IGAD region must accept that it is unable to resolve the crisis in South Sudan and hand over responsibility for the mediation effort to the AU. The four frontline states can still engage in the context of an AU-led mediation, but they should not be able to dominate the process and use it as a forum to promote their own narrowly defined interests. The AU should start preparing itself now by developing a political strategy for a possible AU-led mediation effort. This strategy should go beyond any eminent personalities that may be appointed to lead the process to consider how the AU approach would differ from that of IGAD. In addition, IGAD and the AU should make clear to the warring parties that if they fail to agree on a political settlement in the context of the HLRF, IGAD and the AU will request that punitive measures be imposed on parties who undermine the process. Such punitive measures are long past due and are the only means to communicate to the leadership on all sides of the political divide that the African region will no longer allow the people of South Sudan and the region to be held hostage to their leaders' pursuit of power.

Annex – Signatories

1. Ana Taban
2. Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA)
3. Centre for Peace and Justice (CPJ)
4. Dialogue and Research Initiative (DRI)
5. Eve Organization
6. Foundation for Democracy and Accountable Governance (FODAG)
7. Human Rights Development Organization (HURIDO)
8. International Youth for Africa (IYA)
9. Organization for Nonviolence and Development (ONAD)
10. Peace Coalition of South Sudan (PECOSS)
11. South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA)
12. South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy (SSHURSA)
13. South Sudan Law Society (SSLS)
14. South Sudan Network for Democracy and Elections (SSUNDE)
15. South Sudan Young Leaders Forum (SSYLF)
16. South Sudan Women Empowerment Network (SSWEN)
17. Standard Action Liaison Focus (SALF)
18. Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG)
19. Women’s Monthly Forum on the Peace Process